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Anomalous Growth of the Common Lawthe Anglo-American Quest for Juaice.

A

Law is the sense of justice taking form in peoples and races.
-Sir Frederick Pollock.

SOON as social relations begin, there arises the question of

what right each member of society has in the conduct of the
other members. Because of such relations each member must
yield or forego some of the things which otherwise he might like
to do and could do. If the sense of social justice, or righteousness, were at this time developed all men would thus forego
without outside influence. But, since this has never been true
anywhere as yet, it has been necessary universally to have "law".
The purpose of law has been to recognize some of the things
which men must give up to their fellow-men-things which from
the standpoint of one are called legal rights and from the standpoint of the other are called legal duties and legal obligationsand to compel the men under duty and obligation either not
wrongfully to violate such rights, or if they wrongfully do violate
them to restore or redress the same. This is true of all systems
of law-Babylonian, Egyptian, Hebrew, Roman and English.
An ideal system of law would recognize only such rights as
ought to be recognized, and such wrongs as should be regarded
as wrongful violations thereof, and would provide as adequate
remedies as possible for protecting those rights either before
or after violation, and as simple means as possible for enforcing
the same. So long as any one of these ends is lacking, justice has
not been found and people will continue on their quest. Even
if one age should realize an ideal system of law for itself, such
system might not be an ideal one for a succeeding more civilized
age, and thus again the quest for justice would have to go on.
The history of the American and English people, from the time
of William the Conqueror, io66 to date, affords no more fascinating topic than the quest of these people for justice. The quest has
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often been hap-hazard. It has almost always been unconscious.
Yet through the ages an increasing juristic purpose has run. Men
of this age and of that have hunted for justice as other men have
hunted for the elixir of life or the phantom Eldorado. The goal
of justice has not as yet been reached, but the history of the quest
for it is not a history of failure but a history of progress.
CONTRACTS

Our law of contracts has passed through remarkable changes
since the time of William the Conqueror, and I think it will be
admitted that the general tendency of all the changes has been
toward the goal of justice, though the causes which have produced
the changes often had no such ultimate goal in view.
The most important topics in contracts are agreement, consideration, conditions, assignment, legality and discharge.
The modern consensual contract dates from the sixteenth
century. Prior to the sixteenth century contract law did not rest
upon consent. No action for breach of promise, though given for
consideration, would lie prior to Henry VII. Whatever contract
law then existed rested upon the foundation of the actions of
debt and covenant. These actions came into use in the twelfth
century. In debt a promise was not enforced, but proprietary
rights were re-adjusted. In covenant a promise was enforced, but
because of formality not because of agreement. There was no
obligation in the absence of the formal word, however repugnant
to justice the result might be. If the formal word was given,
the giver was bound, however unrighteous it might be to enforce
the promise. In the sixteenth century the action of assumpsit
made its appearance. This was an action on the case in the nature
of deceit. It was at first a tort action, but became a contract action
as the remedy was gradually extended to cases of non-feasance. Yet
as late as i6o6l a goldsmith who sold a stone affirming it to be a
bezoar stone escaped liability though it was not such stone, because
he had not used the magic words "I warrant" or "I undertake".
And as late as the reign of Elizabeth the court held that an innkeeper could obtain no relief at law from a gentleman of quality,
who put up at his inn with his servants and horses because no
price was agreed upon.2 Even today in the cases of conveyances
1 Chandelor v. Lopus (1603), Dyer 75a, n., 73 Eng. Repr. 160, Cro.
Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Repr. 3.
2 Young v. Ashburnsham
(1587), 3 Leon. 161, 74 Eng. Repr. 606.
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of land the grantee must have his covenant in the deed if he would
be protected, although in the sale of chattels implied warranties
arise without the use of magic words. The bilateral contract
made its emergence in the seventeenth century, though it was not
so named until Judge Dillon and Dean Langdell christened it. As
a result of this development contract law today rests upon the
foundation of agreement. One man is under obligation to another
because he has promised. Modern contract law bears little
resemblance to ancient, but there can be no doubt that because of
the growth of the law of agreement, contract law is on a higher
plane today than ever before.
Not every promise is yet legally enforcible. The common law
still requires more than a mere promise to give or to do something.
Of these requirements consideration is the most important. In
the old action of debt the consideration required was benefit to the
promisor (quid pro quo), if we may call this consideration. In
covenant there was no consideration required, except as a result
of the development of assumpsit. In assumpsit the consideration
was detriment to the promisee (or the promise thereof), Debt and
covenant have become almost obsolete as a result of the development of assumpsit.
There are many circumstances under
which a person ought to pay for a benefit conferred, as under the
old action of debt, and if these obligations had gone with debt, the
law might not have progressed; but the old obligations have been
preserved in the modem law of quasi contracts, which grew out
of equitable constructive trusts by the extension of the action of
general assumpsit. The reason why debt had to go was not
because it enforced unjust claims, but because of the mode of proof
(wager of law) connected with it. The true principles of consideration and quasi contracts were unearthed by Langdell, Ames
and Keener when they made their historical survey of the common
law. It may be wondered whether or no the common law has
made progress in its almost inexplicable changes in the matter of
consideration, but I think the importance of liability where a
promise has been given in exchange for some legal detriment alone
will convince anyone that such is the case. The time may come
when other promises should be enforced, but no fewer promises
should be enforced than are now enforced by the common law.
The study of the historical development of consideration shows
progress in the quest for justice.
In the early common law there were no conditions except
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express conditions, but the courts began to scrutinize covenants
for conditions. After the simple bilateral contract came into
existence the old analogies at first prevailed, and only express conditions were recognized. Lord Holt came close to the implication
of conditions in i7oi, 3 but the honor remained for the great Lord
Mansfield, who, in 1773, clearly established the doctrine of implied
dependency as to conditions precedent.4 In 1792 it was held that
concurrent as well as precedent conditions would be implied.'
Mansfield developed implied conditions by the road of the construction of the intention of the parties. In modem law conditions
are implied from the idea of the court as to what is just, because
it assumes that performance is presumed to be given for performance. Today there are many contrary holdings and perhaps undue
technicality in regard to the performance of express conditions,
installment contracts and breach of conditions; but no one will
dispute that the law of conditions as a whole is in the line of
progress, and that the modem theory of implied conditions is
close to the goal of justice.
The common law allowed no assignment of the rights of contract. Equity permitted the assignee to sue wherever specific
performance would lie. Then the common law permitted the
assignee to sue in the name of the assignor. Later the codes
authorized the assignee to sue in his own name, adopting the
principle of equity. Each one of these changes marks a step in
advance.
As to what will amount to illegality, the decisions of the
courts also show a growing moral sense. Wagers, which were
first held illegal in England, and then legal if not against public
policy, have in the United States been held illegal because against
public policy. In some matters, such as champerty and maintenance, the decisions of the courts are not so rigid now as they
formerly were, and some think that thereby the courts have taken
steps backward, but not many instances of this sort are named.
At one time an accord and satisfaction, but not an accord
alone, would discharge a contract, because the doctrine arose
before the modem consensual contract, and the rule persisted
after-the reason for it disappeared; but an accord was allowed to
3
Thorp v. Thorp (1701), 12 Mod. 455, 88 Eng. Repr. 1448.
4Kingston v. Preston (1773), cited in Jones v. Barkley, 2 Douglas
689, 99 Eng. Repr. 437.
5 Goodisson v. Nunn (1792), 4 T. R. 761, 100 Eng. Repr. 1288.
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discharge a contract in case of a composition in 1831, 6 and today
an accord generally is enough if it is the intention of the parties
to take the accord in satisfaction. There may be a question
whether the law of discharge is not still overburdened by
technicalities, as for example in the requirement of a consideration and the refusal by the United States courts to allow the
rescission, by an oral bilateral, of a unilateral contract before breach.
There can be no question but that the law has been in a constant
state of improvement.
Thus it clearly appears that the Anglo-American law of contracts has been, not only constantly changing-instead of remaining fixed, as some maintain is the characteristic of the common
law of the past, and should be the characteristic of the common
law of the present-but it has been constantly approaching more
nearly to the ideal of justice.
AGENCY

When our substantive law shall have reached perfection, how
far will the legal consequences of one person's acts be visited on
another? Apparently our common law has not been able as yet
to answer this question. The common law of agency began with
the vicarious responsibility of a man for the acts of the members
of his own household. Civilization could not long tolerate such a
rule. Consequently we find that criminal responsibility passed
away by ioo and civil responsibility by 13oo.

From 1300 to

1689 one person was responsible for the acts of another only in
cases of command.7 One who had suffered from the unauthorized
misconduct of a servant, acting within the scope of his employment, could obtain no compensation. As a result largely of the
revolution of i688 the English courts held that there was a presumption that all acts done in furtherance of the master's affairs
were done by his authority.' This was in the time of Blackstone
and Lord Holt. In the nineteenth century this presumption
ripened into a positive rule. In torts a master is liable now for
any act of his servant in the course of his employment and in
furtherance of it. In contracts a principal is bound by any contract which the agent makes while acting within the scope of his
actual or apparent authority. To these rules the fellow servant
doctrine is the great exception. Here the common law apparently
6 Good v. Cheesman (1831), 2 Barn. & Ad. 328, 109 Eng. Repr. 1165.

7 7 Harv. Law Rev. 330, 332, 335, 384.
s Tuberville v Stampe (1698), Comb. 459, 90 Eng. Repr. 590.
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has lagged behind the times, for the modem legislatures are passing
workmen's compensation acts for the ostensible purpose of relieving the workmeft from an unjust rule. An undisclosed principal
was allowed to sue in 1712 and to be sued in I812.9 Justice probably always will demand some measure of liability by a master
and principal for the acts of servants and agents, yet it would
seem that progress would come by reducing this liability to the minimum and by holding all men liable only for their own wrong doing.
It is unjust to hold a master liable for damage done by his servants
when acting within the course of their employment although they
carelessly or even wilfully disregard his instructions, and although
he has used all possible care in their selection; yet expediency will
require this rule for some time to come. However, it would seem
that, as to their rights, servants should be put upon the same
footing as strangers, whatever rule is adopted as righteous and
just.
Enough has been said to show that, though there may be
difficulty in deciding how much progress there has been made in
the development of the substantive law of agency, there have been
as great changes here as in the law of contracts.
BAILMENTS,

CARRIERS AND PUBLIC CALLINGS

The early law of bailments, carriers and public callings cannot
be understood apart from the action of detinue, which was the one
action (aside from account) available to bailors and which gave
character to the substantive law of bailments and public callings.
Bailees were regarded as owing to the bailors the chattels placed
in the formers' possession. Bailees in public calling were liable for
particular losses as insurers. In 173 Lord Holt,10 borrowing
doctrines largely from the Roman law, decreased the liability of
all bailees except common carriers, though he did not put the
liability of mandataries and ordinary hiring bailees as low as it
would be placed today. In 1785" common carriers became absolute insurers except for the act of God and the act of the public
enemy. Today, in bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor the
bailees are bound to exercise only slight diligence; in bailments
for the sole benefit of the bailee, the bailees are bound to exercise
high diligence; in bailments for mutual benefit, the bailees are
9 Paterson v. Gandasequi (1812), 15 East 62, 104 Eng. Repr. 768.
10 Coggs v. Bernard (1704), 2 Ld. Raymond 909, 92 Eng. Repr. 107.
"' Forward v. Pittard (1785). 1 T. R. 27, 99 Eng. Repr. 953.
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bound to exercise ordinary diligence; though it seems permissible
to vary these obligations to some extent by special contract.
Public callings, once many, grew less with the theories of individualism and competition in vogue in Adam Smith's time; but
more recently have been growing again in numbers, until now in
the United States they include public warehousemen, innkeepers, all
common carriers of goods and of passengers, public utilities, and
possibly insurance companies, the associated press and even the
so-called trusts. At first to be an innkeeper one had to furnish
food, lodging and stabling, but the law has undergone change
gradually until today lodging (for transients) alone may be
enough." ' All public callings always have been required by the
common law to serve with adequate facilities, for reasonable
compensation and (more recently) without discrimination. In
respect to the above obligations the law has undergone little
change, either because true and universal principles were discovered early, or because courts and law makers have been too
busy applying the obligations to change them. Methods of regulation of public callings have had remarkable growth. As to diligence and liability for loss the law has not been so stationary.
Innkeepers at first were not liable for injury to guests 13 but were
liable almost as insurers for their goods, while today they are
liable to the guests for negligence and are under only a prima facie
liability for their goods, which last liability may be escaped by
showing absence of negligence.1 4 The common carrier's early
common law liability has been modified in modern times by adding
to the exceptions to his absolute liability. Now the common carrier
is excused from liability, not only when the loss is due to act of
God or act of public enemy, but also, to inherent nature of
goods, act of the shipper and act of public authority. Common
carriers of passengers remain bound, in absence of special contract, to exercise the highest diligence.
The courts have permitted all persons engaged in public callings to narrow their common law liability for loss of goods so
long as they do not exempt themselves from liability for negligence, 15 and the majority of the courts now allow common carriers
o Nelson v. Johnson (1908), 104 Minn. 440, 116 N. W. 828.
13 Cayle's Case (1584), 8 Co. 32 a.
14 johnson v. Chadbourn Finance Co. (1903), 89 Minn. 310, 94

N. W. 874.

15 Some courts, as for example the English and New York courts,
have allowed even greater freedom of contract.

II0
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of passengers to exempt themselves from all liability, except for
wanton acts, to persons riding on free passes. 16 As a consequence
common carriers of goods have had two rates, one for shipment
under contract liability and another for shipment under common
law liability. How far the freedom of contract is going to be
allowed to grow is problematical, but there are indications of governmental limitation on such growth and of a return to one
liability, more liberal than the so-called modern common law and
less liberal than the modern contract.
No more interesting example of the anomalous growth of the
common law can be found than in the law of bailments, and public
callings. Here we see how the over-exacting requirements of the
early law have been modified, and how the law has changed from
century to century to meet changing conditions. This branch of
the law may not be perfect yet, but a historical review shows a
constant approach to perfection. No one would care to go back
to the law of the twelfth century. Why, on the one hand, should
a system so progressive be criticised, or, on the other hand,
should any objection be made to future changes in such a system?
PERSONS
The growth of the law of persons has been kaleidoscopic, but
it must be admitted that most of the changes, which advancing
civilization has demanded, have been accomplished by legislation
rather than by the evolution of the common law through the
instrumentality of the judges. Thus have come about the great
reforms in the law of married women, infants, the insane and
corporations. The common law is not to be commended for its
position herein but rather is the subject of criticism, so that the
opponents of change in the common law will find little comfort in
the history of the law of persons. Today in spite of the great
legislative reforms of the past, the law of persons still needs other
minor reforms, and its growth should continue. The law as to the
rights and obligations of married women needs important modifications in many jurisdictions. Has not the time come when the
defense of infancy should to a large extent be abolished? Should
not a lunatic be compelled to make reparation to one injured by
his act-at least if the lunatic is rich and the injured person is
poor?
16 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Adams
Ed. 513, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408.

(1904),

192 U.

S. 440, 48 L.
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PROPERTY

The law of property affords a rich field to the student of the
Anglo-American quest for justice.
In the development of the law of liens we see a rather strange
instance of injustice, where apparently judges were trying hard
to work out principles of justice. In the beginning, common law
liens were given when there was no promise, and therefore the
party would have been remediless had not a lien been given him.
The next step in the development was where the lien was given
also when there was an inferred promise, but the lien was not
given in such case to the agister because it had been decided in
the first stage of development of the law of liens that an agister,
who in that case happened to have an express promise, had no lien.
Finally the lien was given also when there was an express promise.
Of course now there was not the shadow of an excuse for not
giving the lien to the agister, but the mistake continued, so that
it had to be corrected by statute. Most states have now made this
correction.17
In perhaps no branch of the law do we find more changes than
in that of real property, and in perhaps none is it more difficult
to decide whether or not the changes have been toward the goal
of justice. Many changes have been brought about by such outside
influences as legislatures and chancery. Yet the common law
courts are not without some credit in the matter. One of the
most unfortunate results of this sort of development is the great
amount of legal debris that still clutters up the territory of the
modem rules, which have finally been evolved.
The incubus of the feudal system with its estates and tenures
has been gotten out of the way, but what a trail it has left upon
of the law of real property! Military, socage, frankalmoign and
villenage tenures, because of legislative reforms, no longer exist,
but their mark can still be seen. The Statute of Quia Emptores
(I29O) hit the first blow at the system by abolishing subinfeudations, and the Statute of Charles II (166o) abolished all tenures
except common socage (Grand Serjeanty, etc.) But today land
is still held of the state as is shown by the doctrines of escheat,
taxation and eminent domain.
What a history the fee tail has had! It was a fee conditional
before 1285. It was a fee tail between 1285 and 1473. Beginning
117See Ames in 2 Harv. Law Rev. 61, 62.
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with 1473 it was defeated and made a fee by the devices of common
recoveries and fines, and in 1579 the rule announced in Shelley's
Case completed the work of destruction so far as the courts
could destroy it. In 1833 the power of alienation was granted in
England, and in the United States the fee tail has been abolished
generally by statute.
The common law judges refused to enforce a use or trust, and
refused to allow gaps or laps in estates. Equity (1422) began to
enforce uses out of analogy to the enforcement of devises. 18 In
1536 the Statute of Uses was enacted in the interest of the land
owners for the purpose of destroying uses, but by a strange legal
chance had the opposite effect. However, the Statute of Uses was
not broad enough to include all uses, and equity continued its
jurisdiction in the case of a use on a use, active trusts, use
grounded on an estate less than freehold, estates tail and copyholds.
As a further result of its work in this connection equity, overriding gaps and laps, gave us the new estates of resulting, springing
and shifting uses, and the new conveyances of bargain and sale
and covenant to stand seised.
Before 1278 guardians in chivalry, and tenants by curtesy and
dower alone were liable for waste. All of these were liable for
voluntary waste, but probably none of them for permissive waste.
After 1278 tenants for life and for years, by virtue of the Statute
of Gloucester, and tenants at will, by virtue of judicial construction, have been liable for voluntary waste in both England and the
United States until today, for permissive waste in England until
I8991' and in the United States still, and for ameliorating waste
in England (though not in the United States) until 1891.20 These
slow but desirable changes have corrected most of the defects of
the law of waste. But one further defect had to be corrected by
equity. This was the liability of tenants for life without impeachment for waste, tenants in tail after possibility and owners in fee
upon limitations, for using the property otherwise than a prudent
man would. Equity held all of these parties liable (1599) and the
name of equitable waste has accordingly been given to the conduct.
The test of a fixture was at first physical annexation, but this
test has gradually become less important, except in machinery
cases, until today in the United States the test is intention, either
18 2 Select Anglo-American Essays 715.
19 In re Cartwright (1889), L. R., 41 Ch. Div. 532.
20 Meux v. Cobley, [1892] 2 Ch. Div. 253.
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expressed, or if not expressed, as inferred from (a) the relation
to the freehold of the annexer, (b) the mode and degree of annexation, and (c) adaptability to the use of the freehold." The result
is that a great and just distinction is made between annexation by
the owner or one standing in an analogous position, and annexation
by a tenant.
The early common law as to waters has been modified so as to
bring it into harmony with modem conditions. Riparian ownership of watercourses, surface and subterranean, has been modified
in the western United States by the doctrine of appropriationabsolute and modified. The common law doctrine that surface
waters were a common enemy has been modified in some jurisdictions by the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. The common law doctrine which permitted the drainage away of percolating
waters, while at the same time giving absolute ownership, has been
modified so as not to permit the taking away of water from
another's land by means of pumps, etc.
BILLS AND NOTES

Bills (or letters) of exchange were legally recognized in the
beginning of the fifteenth century, and the evolution of five
centuries has produced but slight changes in the most marked
features of the early law. One great change which has made
headway, in spite of the formal character of bills and notes, is
that of alienability by indorsement, through the growth of the law
of representation and the improvement of title by transfer. But
in the main they were formal contracts, remain formal contracts
and ought to remain such, because of the exigencies of the business world. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act is an effort
22
to so fix the law.

INSURANCE

The law of insurance is another part of the common law whose
roots run back into the law merchant. The law merchant was
introduced into London by the Italian merchants on Lombard
Street, and was at first enforced by merchants' courts. The history
of the law of insurance is largely a history of how the common
law got jurisdiction away from the merchants' courts. In 1570
the Privy Council appointed arbitrators, but this scheme failed.
The admiralty courts were not satisfactory. The Court of Insurance
21Teaff v. Hewitt (1853), 1 Oh. St. 511.
223 Select Anglo-American
Essays 51.
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Commissioners created by act of Parliament (16Ol) was unsuccessful and died. The regular common law courts were at first unfit
(I588), but Lord Mansfield (1756-1788) accomplished what others
had failed to accomplish. By summoning juries of merchants to
establish the customs, usages and maritime laws of the continent
he succeeded in giving the King's Bench jurisdiction over insurance
cases. Insurable interest was required by statute in 1746. The
concealment doctrine arose in 1743.23

The warranty doctrine arose

in 169i. -4 The technicalities of the law merchant features of
insurance law are in modem times becoming of less and less
importance owing to the adoption of standard policies. The future
of insurance law seems destined to be involved in the increasing
power of the state over the conduct of the business. This may
take either the direction of state insurance, as in the state of Wisconsin, or, more probably, the direction of state control, on the
theory that insurance companies are public callings, as in the
states of Iowa2 5 and Kansas. The law of public callings would
seem to afford a complete solution to any problems of injustice
that remain in connection with the law of insurance.
SALES

In the law of sales we discover many problems which have
long bothered the courts, while they have been on their quest for
justice.
Should the ascertainment of price be a condition precedent to
the passing of title? At first it was held in England that title could
be transferred only by delivery or payment. Then the reciprocal
grant doctrine was adopted, whereby it was held that title might
pass without delivery and payment if credit was given. Finally
the English courts held that title would pass according to the
intention of the parties whether or not credit was given. Then
arose the question: If something remains to be done to ascertain
the price does that indicate an intention not to have title pass?
This was at first answered in the affirmative as an absolute rule.26
Later this was qualified by confining the rule to an unascertained
price to be fixed by the seller."
The English Sale of Goods Act
has so fixed the law. In the United States some courts follow
23 Seaman
24

v. Fonereau (1743), 2 Str. 1183, 93 Eng. Repr.
Jeffry v. Legender (1692), 3 Lev. 320, 83 Eng. Repr.
25 Duffy v. Bankers etc. Assn. (Iowa, 1913), 139 N. W.
26 Hanson v. Meyer (1805), 6 East 614, 102 Eng. Repr.
27Turley v. Bates (1863), 2 H. & C. 200.

1115.
710.
1087.
1425.
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Hanson v. Meyers, some Turley v. Bates, and a few have done
away with the presumption of retention of property because something remains to be done to ascertain price.
Should the title pass at once in the sale of a specific quantity
from a larger uniform mass? The English courts at first answered
yes;2 but this case was overruled by later cases, in spite of the
fact that the same courts recognized tenancy in common in the
case of confusion of goods. In the United States the prevailing
doctrine has been that title will pass if the parties so intend. 29 At
first it was doubted if the parties would be tenants in common, but
now it is held that they are tenants in common with right of
severance in the case of fungible goods.
Should title pass in a cash sale? The early law was that title
would not pass. Payment or credit was required. In modem law
there is a presumption that there is an absolute sale, but that the
seller has a lien in lieu of title.
In the sale of goods having a so-called potential existence,
should the title pass when the goods come into existence freed from
any defects of title due to rights which have accrued since the
time of the original bargain? An early English case, 30 decided
after the doctrine was already two hundred years old, held that a
seller might so transfer title. This, since, was limited to crops and
the young of animals, and at last was abolished in England by the
Sale of Goods Act. The doctrine has been narrowed in the United
States, so as not to apply to crops to be grown beyond the next
season. The American Sales Act follows the English in this
respect. But it is held that, though the doctrine of potential
existence is abolished and turned into a contract to sell, such contract to sell may have equitable effect in the nature of a lien upon
the goods as acquired, except against bona fide third persons,
where specific performance would lie, or a mortgage has been given
and damages would not be an adequate remedy for a promise to
give security.
CRIMES AND TORTS

Prior to I200 the law of torts and crimes was not separated,
and the rule was to visit liability on the visible offending thing.3'
All early English law was unmoral even after 1200, but this
28 Whitehouse v. Frost
29 Kimberly v. Patchin
3 Grantham v. Hawley
3' Wigmore in 3 Select

(1810), 12 East 614, 104 Eng. Repr. 239.
(1859), 19 N. Y. 330.
(1616), Hob. 132, 80 Eng. Repr. 281.
Anglo-American Essays 474.
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was especially true of early criminal law. It was written in blood.
It made no distinction between crimes and criminals.
rhough a
party assailed had killed his assailant in self-defense, using no
unnecessary force, such killing was not justifiable homicide. He
had to go to prison, and trust to the king's mercy for pardon, and
although he obtained his pardon he had to forfeit his goods for
his crime. Yet our English ancestors desired justice, and when
their moral sense rebelled against the unmoral character of their
early law, changes in their criminal law began to appear. Criminal
liability in case of killing in self-defense disappeared comparatively
early. First, pardon became a matter of course, and then the jury
was allowed to give a verdict of not guilty. Many other reforms
in the substantive side of our criminal law have followed. But,
when many of our states still have from a thousand to fifteen
hundred acts catalogued as crimes and misdemeanors, it is at least
an open question as to whether or no the work of reform is completed. Yet, astounding as is the fact of the number of things still
made crimes or misdemeanors, it is also an open question as to
whether or no we should not have more acts made crimes. Suppose
a man, who accidentally shoots another by a glancing shot, should,
after seeing his victim, go off and allow him to die. Ought this
man to be held criminally liable or not? Again, ought not an innocent man to be compensated by the state for an unmerited punishment?
The early English tort law, after i2oo, was characterized by the
same absolute liability. A defendant sued in trespass for battery
was liable, though he showed that he was acting in self-defense.
He had committed the battery and must make reparation. But of
course he had an independent action against the plaintiff. Early
English tort law was also mostly confined to trespass. Prior to
I50o the common law gave no redress against the slanderer. For
centuries no action was maintained for deceit in the sale of a
chattel. An action for malicious prosecution-though a criminal
prosecution instigated malevolently with knowledge of the plaintiff's
innocence-would not lie until the middle of the seventeenth
century. 32 No relief against the unauthorized printing by a
stranger of an unpublished work of an author was given until the
second quarter of the eighteenth century. The action of the
husband for the alienation of the affections of his wife dates from
32
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The tort of procuring breach of contract is still more
[745.8
recent." The unmoral character of early tort law had to give way as
the English people continued on their quest for justice. However,
the doctrine of civil liability for damage caused by a morally innocent actor was very persistent. Thus a sleep walker would be held
liable for everything he broke in his sleep. But little by little there
grew up the doctrine that an unintentional injury to another would
not render the actor liable, and finally, in i891, the court of Queen's
Bench 5 held not liable a man who shot out the eye of another by
a glancing shot fired at a pheasant. The late Dean Ames remarks:
"The early law asked simply--'Did the defendant do the physical
act which damaged the plaintiff?' The law of today, except in
cases based on public policy, asks the further question-'Was the
act blameworthy?'"
Yet, great as have been the changes in the law of torts, we cannot yet say that the transformations are complete. Should a
lunatic be held liable for damage inflicted by him? Should one be
required to keep at his peril fierce wild animals and domestic
animals after knowledge that they are dangerous? Should a bank
be liable on a bank note printed but never issued, if it is stolen?
Should not a judge be held liable for slanderous words spoken on
the bench? Should not one be liable for using without consent for
advertising purposes another's likeness? Should not a man be liable
in all jurisdictions for damage done by a spite fence? Should not
a man be civilly liable when .he sees another in great danger, as
drowning, or on a railroad .track, if he makes no effort to rescue?
REmEIES

Aside from certain possessory actions, the only remedy which
the ancient common law gave for civil wrongs was damages, and
even that remedy in the beginning was not the developed remedy of
today. The remedy of damages was available at common law only
where common law actions were available. Until the sixteenth
century none of the actions on the case-including trover, trespass
on the case, case, special assump~it and general assumpsit-were
available, and trespass and account were not available until the
thirteenth century. The various actions on the case were the crea33 Winsmore v. Greenbank (1745), Willes, 577, 125 Eng. Repr. 1330.
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tions of the clerks in chancery acting under Statute of Parliament
enacted in 1289. Upon the actions on the case is based our whole
law of defamation, malicious prosecution, deceit, nuisance, negligence, express contracts, inferred contracts, and quasi contracts.
Even our law of damages is of modem origin. There could be no
law of damages so long as the jury-which came in with the action of
trespass-exercised its early function of deciding facts as of its own
knowledge, or even so long as the damages were "at large" as in
torts generally. The growth of the law of damages has come
through the courts obtaining control over the machinery of proof,
making the verdict conform to a standard of damages derived from
legal principles, and holding these legal principles binding upon
itself.
But even our perfected modern remedy of damages would have
been wholly inadequate for many injuries which were constantly
being inflicted by men upon their fellowmen. The promise under
seal was regarded at common law, not as evidence of the contract,
but as the contract itself. Accordingly, if the promisee lost the
instrument or if it was destroyed, he had no action, for a year
book judge said, "if the specialty is lost the whole action is lost." 38
Ethically the promisee was still entitled to the amount named in the
instrument as much as though it had not been lost or destroyed, but
the early law was not concerned with ethics. Likewise an obligor
who had formally executed an instrument, was helpless though it
was obtained by fraud or was given for immoral purposes, or upon
an assumption in the offer that was not true, or even if he had
once already paid the same in full, if he had neglected to take a
release or to secure the destruction of the instrument.37 Often,
injuries threatened were so serious that they ought to be prevented,
or injuries committed were so irreparable that they ought to be
specifically repaired; damages would be an inadequate remedy in
either case. These defects in the common law remedies have been
remedied by equity.
Equity has been the greatest single factor in the development
of the English law. Its influence has not been confined to the law
of remedies, in spite of the fact that it has given us some twentyfive equitable remedies. It has also contributed to the perfection
of the common law, by supplying some omissions in procedure, and
38 Y.
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in the substantive law of antecedent legal rights, and it has also
contributed much to all branches of law by giving them a more
ethical aspect.
Equity acts in personam rather than in rem and it has therefore
regarded the duty of the defendant more than the right of the
plaintiff, and because of this emphasis has been more ethical than
law. The injustice of allowing an obligor to profit at the expense
of an obligee because of the mere loss of an obligation prevailed in
chancery in the seventeenth century, and in the following century
in the common law courts, where recovery was allowed on secondary evidence. Equity also gave relief to an obligor when it
would be unconscionable to permit the obligee to enforce fiis obligation, by commanding him under pain of imprisonment to abstain
from the exercise of his right. Now, by statute, defendants are
allowed at common law to plead equitable defenses. Equity has
granted specific performance of certain obligations (fifteenth
century) ,38 enjoined the performance of other acts (sixteenth
century), granted rescission and cancellation of contracts for fraud,
mistake and other inequitable conduct, restrained the enforcement
of common law judgments obtained by fraud, compelled mortgagees
to surrender mortgaged property, compelled the holders of penal
bonds to surrender them up without exacting the penalty, and
established constructive trusts-acting upon the highly moral
principle that no one should, by the wrongful acquisition or retention of property, unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
Should a third person for whose sole benefit a contract is made
be allowed to sue thereon? England permitted such suit in a case
decided in 1677,39 but repudiated this position in 1861.40 In the
United States, Massachusetts and New York do not allow such
suits, except in insurance cases; but most of the other states do
allow them, although the reasons therefor have not as yet been
fully worked out. On strict common law principles (in assumpsit)
perhaps the action ought not to lie. Early equity gave no such relief.
Yet here is a case where some remedy is needed. Most courts have
arisen to the situation and have invented a remedy in the nature of
equitable relief. This is a good illustration of the latent power of

Ames, Cases on Equity, 37.
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the courts still to extend the law of remedies where justice requires
it.

41

PROCEDURE

Nothing in connection with the Anglo-American system of law
is more remarkable than the history of the law of procedure. Constant changes have been the order. The earliest forms of administering justice which existed in self-help gave way to the ordeal
and wager of law peculiar to Anglo-Saxon procedure. The AngloSaxon ordeal and wager of law were in turn replaced by the
Norman jury (and to some extent by the Norman wager of
battle). The jury system itself underwent constant change. The
jury little by little changed from witness-judges to judges of the
facts, and less and less power in this last respect has been given
them because of the growth of the law of damages. Attorneys
took the place of champions, and an intellectual tournament thus
was substituted for the old physical tournament. The technical
rules of pleading, evidence and practice grew up. Common law
procedure was under continual change. Equity procedure has
modified common law procedure, and in turn has been modified
by it. Legislation, as in the English Judiciary Act of 1873, the
Field Code and the New York Code of Civil Procedure abolished
the distinctions between the various forms of actions, simplified
the rules of pleading to some extent by requiring the allegation
of the facts, modified the rules of evidence slightly-as by allowing parties to civil actions to testify-and attempted to reform the
rules of practice by requiring the determination of law suits upon
their merits. In common law procedure justice was sacrificed on
the altar of form. Technicality was more important than justice.
The rules of procedure had to be obeyed, no matter whether legal
wrongs were prevented or redressed. The means was allowed to
become the end. Much was expected of the code reforms. More
might have been acomplished thereby, had the attorneys of the
day taken more kindly to them. As a matter of fact our code
procedure is practically as bad as common law procedure ever was.
A class of attorneys-shrewd, tricky and ingenious-has been
developed.
Delays, reversals, technicalities and expense are
weapons in constant use. Administration of justice is a game

41 Williston's Wald's Pollock on Contracts, 237-278; 3 Select AngloAmerican Essays 339.
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played by practitioners at the expense of their clients and society.
Procedure has again become the end instead of the means.
What should be the future of our legal procedure? Shall we
allow our procedure, our machinery for the administration of
justice, to continue to be a game so expensive that only the rich
can afford it? Or shall it become a system for the administration
of justice on earth? The answer cannot be too emphatic, that procedure must soon retire to its proper place. If the legal profession does not take on itself the task of seeing that this is done,
society will do it without the aid of the legal profession.
Progress in the past has been slow-too slow-but we have had
progress; we are going to continue to have progress. Our laws
will fit future generations no more than the laws of the eleventh
and twelfth centuries fit us. We must press forward, not backward, and you and I and all others engaged in work in the legal
field should help in the Quest for Justice.
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